Boneh and Venkatesan have proposed a polynomial time algorithm for recovering a "hidden" element α ∈ IF p , where p is prime, from rather short strings of the most significant bits of the residue of αt modulo p for several randomly chosen t ∈ IF p . González Vasco and the first author have recently extended this result to subgroups of IF * p of order at least p 1/3+ε for all p and to subgroups of order at least p ε for almost all p. Here we introduce a new modification in the scheme which amplifies the uniformity of distribution of the 'multipliers' t and thus extend this result to subgroups of order at least (log p)/(log log p) 1−ε for all primes p. As in the above works, we give applications of our result to the bit security of the Diffie-Hellman secret key starting with subgroups of very small size, thus including all cryptographically interesting subgroups.
Introduction
For a prime p, denote by IF p the field of p elements and always assume that it is represented by the set {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}. Accordingly, sometimes, where obvious, we treat elements of IF p as integer numbers in the above range.
For a real η > 0 and t ∈ IF p we denote by MSB η (t) any integer which satisfies the inequality |t − MSB η (t)| < p2 −η−1 .
Roughly speaking, MSB η (t) is an integer having about η most significant bits as t (taking into account our convention about the elements of IF p ). However, this definition is more flexible and better suited to our purposes.
In particular we remark that η in the inequality (1) need not be an integer. Given a subgroup G ⊆ IF * p we consider the following hidden number problem over G:
Recover a number α ∈ IF p such that for k elements t 1 , . . . , t d ∈ G, chosen independently and uniformly at random from G, we are given k pairs (t h , MSB η (αt h )) , h = 1, . . . , d, for some η > 0.
For G = IF * p this problem has been introduced and studied by Boneh and Venkatesan [1, 2] . In [1] a polynomial time algorithm is designed which recovers α for some η ∼ (log p) 1/2 and k = O(log 1/2 p). The algorithm of [1] has been extended in several directions. In particular, in [5] it is generalised to all sufficiently large subgroups G ⊆ IF * p . This and other generalisations have led to a number of cryptographic applications, see [20, 21, 22] . Using bounds of exponential sums from [7, 10] it has been shown that the algorithm of [1] works for subgroups G ⊆ IF * p of order #G ≥ p ν+ε where for any ε > 0 and sufficiently large Q one can take
Using a recent improvement of [9] of the bounds of exponential sums one can obtain the same result with
• ν = 0 for all primes p ∈ [Q, 2Q], except at most Q 3/4+ε of them.
However, in practical applications one would probably choose a subgroup of order about exp c(log p) 1/3 (log log p) 2/3 for some constant c > 0 in order to balance complexities of the number field sieve based attacks and Pollard's rho-method based attacks, see [6, 13, 16, 17, 23] .
Here we extend the algorithm of [1] to the case of almost arbitrary subgroups G ⊆ IF * p . More precisely, our result applies to any subgroup G ⊆ IF * p of size #G ≥ log p/(log log p) 1−ε , thus it includes all subgroups of cryptographically interesting sizes. As in [1] , our method is based on lattice reduction algorithms and also makes use of exponential sums, however not in such a direct way as in [5] . Namely, we introduce certain new arguments allowing to amplify the uniformity of distribution properties of small subgroups G. This allows us to use the bound of exponential sums from [8] with elements of G, which is very moderate in strength (and does not imply any uniformity of distribution properties of G which would be the crucial argument of the method of [5] ). The bound of [8] has however the very important advantage over the bounds of [7, 9, 10] that it applies to subgroups of order #G ≥ log p/(log log p) 1−ε . It is interesting to note that our approach has links with the famous Waring problem which has been studied in number theory for several hundred years. In fact, the Waring problem in finite fields has been the main motivation of the bound of exponential sums of [8] which we use in this paper. For surveys of recent results on this problem see [3, 8, 24] . As in [1, 5] we apply our algorithm for the hidden number problem to derive a bit security result for the Diffie-Hellman scheme.
We hope that similar ideas can be used for several other variants of the hidden number problem and its applications, see [20, 21, 22] . On the other hand, it should be remarked that our approach requires an increase in the number of oracle calls (which remains polynomial nevertheless, in particular it never exceeds (log p) 4 ). Throughout the paper log x always denotes the binary logarithm of x > 0 and the constants in the 'O'-symbols may occasionally, where obvious, depend on a small positive parameter ε and are absolute otherwise. We always assume that p is a prime number with p ≥ 5, thus the expressions log log p and log log log p are defined (and positive).
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2 Exponential sums and distribution of short sums of elements of subgroups
For a complex z we put e p (z) = exp(2πiz/p).
Now by Theorem 1 of [8] we have the following bound, see also [3, 9, 10] .
holds.
For an integer k ≥ 1, a subgroup G ⊆ IF * p and t ∈ IF p we denote by N k (G, t) the number of solutions of the equation
Recalling the relation between the set of nth powers, where n = (p − 1)/T , we see that studying the above congruence is equivalent to studying the congruence
The problem of finding the smallest possible value of k for which the congruence (or in more traditional settings the corresponding equation over Z Z) has a solution for any t is known as the Waring problem. However for our purposes just a solvability is not enough. Rather we need an asymptotic formula for the number of solutions. We show that Lemma 1 can be used to prove that for reasonably small k, N k (G, t) is close to its expected value.
Lemma
holds for any integer k ≥ C(ε)(log p) 2+ε .
Proof. The well-known identity (see for example [12, Chapter 5.1])
Separating the term T k /p, corresponding to λ = 0, and applying Lemma 1 to other terms, we obtain 
where the supremum is extended over all subintervals J of [0, 1], |J| is the length of J, and A(J, N ) denotes the number of points γ n in J for 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1. Informally speaking the discrepancy tells us how much the number of hits A(J, N ) of a given interval J differs from its expected value |J|N . Now, following [14] we say that a finite sequence T of elements of IF p is ∆-homogeneously distributed modulo p if for any integer λ with gcd(λ, p) = 1, the discrepancy of the sequence of fractions (λt/p) t∈T is at most ∆ (we certainly assume that λt ∈ IF p and thus is reduced modulo p and all these points belong to [0, 1]).
The following statement is a generalization of Theorem 1 of [1] and is given in [14] as Lemma 4.
Lemma 3. Let ω > 0 be an arbitrary absolute constant. For a prime p, define η = ω log p log log log p log log p 1/2 and d = 3η −1 log p .
Let T be a 2 −η -homogeneously distributed modulo p sequence of integer numbers. There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A such that for any α ∈ IF p given 2d integers
its output satisfies for sufficiently large p
where the probability is taken over all t 1 , . . . , t d chosen uniformly and independently at random from the elements of T and all coin tosses of the algorithm A.
Hidden Number Problem in Subgroups
Assume that for α ∈ IF * p and a subgroup G ⊆ IF * p of order T , generated by g ∈ IF * p , we are given an oracle HN P µ such that for every x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}, it returns MSB µ (αg x ).
Theorem 4. Let ϑ > 0 be an arbitrary absolute constant and let µ = ϑ log p log log log p log log p
There exists a polynomial time probabilistic algorithm which, for any 1 > ε > 0 and any g ∈ IF * p of order
) calls of the oracle HN P µ and then recovers α with probability at least 1
Proof. For integers w we denote by ⌊w⌋ p the remainder of w on division by p. Take C(ε) from Lemma 2, d from Lemma 3, and put
Then by Lemma 2 the sequence
of k-sums of elements of G is 2 −η -homogeneously distributed modulo p. Now we call the oracle HN P µ for dk uniformly and independently at random chosen r 11 , . . . , r 1k , . . . , r d1 , . . . , r dk ∈ G and get integers u hj with
For h = 1, 2, . . . , d we put
(where we used addition over Z Z).
Note that for sufficiently large p,
Next, we have
If ν = 1 then we have
which is only possible if ⌊v h ⌋ p < p/2 η+1 . If ν = 0 then we have
By Lemma 2, the probability that p/2
. Now the algorithm of Lemma 3 yields the correct α with probability at least 1 + O (d2
Bit Security of the Diffie-Hellman scheme
As in [1, 5] we now apply Theorem 4 to derive a bit security result for the Diffie-Hellman scheme. We assume that for a subgroup G ⊆ IF * p we are given an oracle DH µ which, given the values of X = g x ∈ IF p and Y = g y ∈ IF p , outputs the value of MSB µ (g xy ).
Repeating the same arguments of [5] we derive the following result.
Theorem 5. Let ϑ > 0 be an arbitrary absolute constant and let µ = ϑ log p log log log p log log p
which for any pair (a, b) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T −1} 2 , given the values of A = g a ∈ IF p and B = g b ∈ IF p , makes O (µ −1 (log p) 3+ε ) calls of the oracle DH µ and computes g ab correctly with probability 1
Proof. As in [5] , given a pair (a, b) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T −1} 2 let us select an integer s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} uniformly at random. We compute , we obtain that the probability of gcd(b + s, T ) ≥ ∆ is at most T −ε/2 . In the opposite case, when gcd(b + s, T ) < ∆, the multiplicative order of g s is
Put α s = g a(b+s) . Now we can call the oracle DH µ with g x A = g x+a and g s to evaluate MSB µ g (a+x)(b+s) = MSB µ (α s g x s ) for an integer x chosen uniformly at random in the set {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}. Because T s |T the values of x are uniformly distributed modulo T s as well, thus Theorem 4 can be applied, producing the desired result.
⊓ ⊔
Remarks
It seems very plausible that the same approach can be applied to the hidden number problem over extension fields which is related to proving bit security of XTR and LUC protocols, see [11, 19] , as well as of some tripartite key exchange protocol on elliptic curves, see [4] . In particular, for this purpose one can probably use a very weak bound of [18] which however applies to very small subgroups. As in [1, 5] , Theorem 4 can be applied to a number of other cryptographic protocols, for example to the ElGamal cryptosystem.
In [2] a nonuniform algorithm has been constructed which works with much smaller values η ∼ log log p. This means that if the points t 1 , . . . , t d ∈ G are known in advance, one can design (in exponential time) a certain data structure, that now given d values MSB η (αt h ), h = 1, . . . , d, the hidden number α can be found in polynomial time. In principle our approach can be used to extend the algorithm of [2] , as well. However, this algorithm works only for almost all α ∈ IF p rather than for all of them.
